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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article analyse l’effet du changement technologique sur les frontières de la
firme en se basant sur la théorie des coûts de transaction et la théorie de l’agence. Le
modèle incorpore quatre types de coûts: coûts de production, de coordination, de
management et de transaction. Le marché a des coûts de production plus faibles, mais
des coûts de coordination plus élevés, que la firme. L’analyse est effectuée dans un
cadre principal-deux agents, avec antisélection et risque moral. Les changement
technologiques concernant la technologie de production et les technologies de
l’information entraînent des effets diamétralement opposés sur l’intégration verticale.
En général, le changement technique concernant la technologie de production se
traduit par davantage d’intégration verticale, alors que le changement technique
concernant les technologies de l’information se traduit par davantage d’impartition.
Lorsque le changement technologique concerne le niveau des coûts, son effet sur
l’impartition dépend du différentiel de coûts entre la firme et le marché, et de
l’importance relative des coûts de production et de coordination; tandis que, lorsque le
changement technologique concerne les efforts de réduction des coûts, son effet est
sans ambiguïté. Le papier propose une explication du changement dans l’effet du
progrès technique sur l’impartition durant le vingtième siècle: pourquoi il a favorisé
l’intégration verticale historiquement, et favorise l’impartition (ou du moins a un effet
ambigu) aujourd’hui. L’explication repose sur l’impact de l’évolution de l’importance
relative des activités de production et de coordination sur la relation entre le progrès
technique et l’intégration verticale. Cet article constitue un mariage entre les
explications contractuelles et les explications technologiques de l’existence et des
frontières de la firme.
The paper addresses the effect of technological progress on the frontiers of the
firm, building on transaction cost theory and agency theory. The model incorporates
four types of costs: production, coordination, management, and transaction costs. The
market has lower production costs, but higher coordination costs, than the firm. A
principal-two agents framework with adverse selection and moral hazard is adopted.
It is found that technological progress in production and information technologies
tend to have diametrically opposite effects on procurement. In general, progress in
production technology leads to more vertical integration, whereas progress in
information technology leads to more subcontracting. When technological change
concerns the level of costs, its effect on procurement depends on the cost differential
between the firm and the market, and on the relative importance of production and
coordination costs; whereas, when technological change affects the effect or disutility
of effort, its impact on procurement is unambiguous. The paper provides an
explanation for the changing effect of technological progress on procurement
throughout the twentieth century: why it favoured vertical integration historically, and
                                                     
*  CIRANO and Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5,
Canada, gatallah@uottawa.ca
why it favours subcontracting (or has a mixed effect) today. This explanation relies on
the implication of the evolution of the relative importance of production and
coordination activities for the relationship between technological progress and
vertical integration. The paper constitutes a bridge between contractual explanations
and technological explanations of the existence and frontiers of the firm.
Mots clés: Coûts de transaction, Information privée et asymétrique, Marchés vs.
hiérarchies, Intégration verticale, Changement Technologique, Technologies de
l’information
Keywords: Transaction costs, Asymmetric and private information, Markets vs.
hierarchies, Vertical integration, Technological change, Information technology
JEL: D23, D82, L22, O33
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2Ahmad et al. (1995) discuss how IT facilitate the redesign of organizational functions and processes (through effective use of
communication, data accessibility and common systems designed to process data) to achieve better coordination between design
and construction organizations in the construction industry.
1. Introduction1
During the last two decades large firms in industrialized countries turned toward outsourcing
for an increasing portion of their inputs. Many social, economic, managerial, and technological factors
lie behind this change in procurement. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role technological
change plays in determining procurement practices.
It is useful to distinguish between changes related to information technology (IT), and changes
related to production technology. IT can affect the tradeoff between markets and hierarchies in many
ways. The main types of costs affected by IT are search costs, coordination costs, monitoring costs, and
renegotiation hazards. First, IT reduce the costs of searching for external suppliers, and reduce also the
cost of screening potential employees. Second, IT reduce coordination costs by reducing the costs of
communicating and processing information, and through the use of better integrated databases, easier
data analysis and control, superior query languages, and the networking of information (Malone et al.,
1987, Clemons et al., 1993).2 They also improve coordination within the firm: networking economies
and informational scale economies ease the maintenance of large internal databases. Third, monitoring
requires access to specific information about the supplier’s operations, and this access is facilitated by
the greater availability of information and stronger treatment possibilities (Clemons et al., 1993). At the
same time, IT ease internal monitoring, which makes detection of opportunism within the firm easier.
Finally, IT investments are less specific today, due to standardisation in software, in hardware, in
telecommunications equipment, and in communication standards.
Many authors (e.g. Malone et al., 1987; Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Clemons et al., 1993;
Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Picot et al., 1996) have argued that by reducing transaction costs, IT induce
firms to use more markets and less hierarchies. Empirical evidence supports an inverse relation between
investments in IT and the level of integration of firms (Kambil, 1991; Komninos, 1994; Carlsson, 1988;
Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Shin, 1996). However, the causality could go either way. It may be the case
that firms that outsource more invest more in IT to manage their outsourcing relations more effectively.
Regarding production technology, vertical integration has dominated in an era characterized by
slow technical change and relatively standardised products. Today, product redesigns are more frequent
and markets are more specialised (Powell, 1987). CAD/CAM processes make outsourcing easier (Blois,
1986): design and production engineers can access and manipulate the requirements of external parties
more easily (Clemons et al., 1993); different components of the systems need not be located within the
same firm nor the same plant; suppliers have less independence and hence less margin for errors, given
that they receive specific production instructions; and the systems are compatible with variable
production scales, so that small suppliers are not disadvantaged. Moreover, flexible manufacturing
technologies reduce asset specificity, facilitating outsourcing (Malone et al., 1987). Also, firms use more
service inputs (such as design, quality control, and consulting) than before, and these are outsourced
more often than material inputs, given their technical and specialized character, and their increasing
3See Atallah and Boyer (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the effects of technology on procurement.
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complexity (Daniels, 1985).
Many other interactions between production technology and outsourcing can arise. However,
whereas the effect of IT seems, in general, to favour lower levels of integration, the effects of changes
in production technology are less clear cut. Moreover, changes in IT are common to most sectors, while
changes in production technology are more industry-specific.3
Although there exists an extensive literature discussing the effect of technology on vertical
integration, little formal work has dealt with this topic. Three important exceptions are Baker and
Hubbard (2000), Lewis and Sappington (1991) and Reddi (1994). Baker and Hubbard model how on-
board computers influence vertical integration in the trucking industry. They find that progress in IT
which improves incentives favours outsourcing, while progerss which improves coordination
encourages vertical integration.
Reddi (1994) follows the decision-theoretic framework of Clemons, Reddi and Row (1993) to
analyse the effects of information technologies (IT) on outsourcing. Three types of organization are
possible: vertical integration, (long term) partnerships, and market (short term) suppliers. Quality and
cost are variable across suppliers, who have a cost advantage over the buyer. The firm makes an
investment in IT to coordinate operations with the supplying unit. Higher coordination costs reflect four
characteristics of the component: higher complexity, difficulty of measurement, high demand
uncertainty, and high lead time. The use of more IT reduces coordination costs. Given measurement
difficulties, there is a moral hazard problem regarding quality. Reddi finds that as IT become cheaper
the firm prefers to outsource rather than to produce in-house. When products are complex and
uncertainty is high, partnerships are preferred to market suppliers. As the specificity of IT decreases,
the buyer is more likely to outsource than to produce in-house. For complex (simple) products and high
(low) uncertainty, this increase in outsourcing will favour partnerships (market suppliers). While the
model incorporates production costs, progress in production technology is not considered.
Lewis and Sappington (1991) (LS hereafter) study how the choice by a firm between making
and buying an input is affected by different types of improvements in the production technology. The
firm has a higher cost than the supplier, but the supplier has private information about her costs. The
firm and the supplier can reduce their costs through a cost reducing effort. LS analyse how procurement
is affected by three types of technical progress: a reduction in production costs, a reduction in the
disutility of cost reducing efforts, and an increase in the effect of cost reducing effort. They find that any
of these forms of technical progress leads the firm to choose vertical integration more often. This
follows from two effects induced by technological progress: an efficiency effect and a control effect.
The efficiency effect comes from the differential impact of technological change on the firm and the
supplier, given that they have different costs and different effort levels. The control effect comes from
the impact of technological change on the information rent appropriated by the supplier. The efficiency
effect favours vertical integration because the firm has higher initial costs, while the control effect
favours the supplier because there are no information rents when the input is produced internally. The
main conclusion of the LS model is that technological progress induces the firm to make rather than buy
the input more often. An important limitation of the model is that it does not incorporate IT, which
3represent the bulk of the effects of technology on outsourcing. Also, their model does not allow for
opportunism to arise within the firm.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of technological change on the frontiers of the
firm while taking into account three factors related to the tradeoff between the firm and the market.
First, asymmetric information and opportunism exist in firms as well as in markets. This is in contrast
to the traditional transaction cost view that vertical integration automatically resolves opportunism
problems. Second, the model takes into account the critiques of Demsetz (1988), Foss (1996), Chandler
(1992), and Coase (1990) that transaction cost theory reduces the differences between the market and
the firm to differences in transaction costs, omitting differences in other types of costs. For that, the
model incorporates production and coordination costs, in addition to opportunism costs. Third, the
model goes beyond another limit of transaction cost theory which asserts that technology plays but a
secondary role in determining firms’ frontiers. By incorporating technological change in the presence
of explicit contractual problems, the model shows that technology plays a key role in determining firm’s
frontiers. The paper constitutes a bridge between agency and contractual explanations on the one hand,
and technological explanations on the other hand, of the existence and frontiers of the firm. 
The paper builds on transaction cost theory and agency theory. The problem is studied in a
principal-two agents model with adverse selection and moral hazard. The model is based on the
framework of LS but enlarges the scope of the analysis by incorporating different types of costs and
adopting a richer stochastic environment. Regarding costs, LS consider only production costs, whereas
here both production and coordination costs are incorporated. Regarding the stochastic environment,
in the LS model the disadvantage of the market was due only to private information. As for the firm,
perfect knowledge of the production process was assumed, and no agency problems existed. Here, both
governance structures (hierarchies and markets) have a mixture of deterministic and stochastic elements.
It is found that progress in production and information technologies often has diametrically
opposite effects on procurement. In general, progress in production technology leads to more vertical
integration, whereas progress in information technology leads to more subcontracting. When
technological change concerns the level of costs, its effect on procurement depends on the cost
differential between the firm and the market, and the relative importance of production and coordination
costs; whereas, when technological change affects the effect or disutility of effort, its impact on
procurement is unambiguous. Technical change can reduce the importance of some types of costs in the
firm’s procurement decision. The static effects of competition and monitoring on the frontiers of the
firm, and their dynamic effects regarding how these frontiers are affected by technical change, are
shown to differ.
In contrast to changes in the level of costs, the impact of which depends on the cost differential
between the firm and the market, changes concerning the effect or disutility of cost reducing efforts have
unambiguous impacts on procurement. The explanation lies in the dynamics of the efficiency and
control effects. Technological change induces an efficiency effect (due to the cost differential between
the firm and the market) which favours one type of procurement, and a control effect (due to the private
information of agents) which favours the other type of procurement. When technical progress affects
the level of costs, the efficiency effect dominates when the cost differential is important, whereas the
control effect may dominate when the cost differential is negligible; henceforth the impact of technical
change on procurement depends on the cost differential. When technical progress concerns the effect
4Mahoney (1992) argues that measurement costs and transaction costs have to be considered jointly to predict organizational form.
Lajili (1995) finds that combining the agency and transaction cost approaches yields useful insights for the understanding of
vertical coordination in crop contracting in East Central Illinois.
5Poppo (1995) argues that internal coordination costs may be higher than external coordination costs, because of the use of quasi-
market incentives and decentralization in hierarchies.
6From the study of the semiconductor industry, Monteverde (1995) finds that the integration decision in that industry is positively
related to the intensity of unstructured technical dialogue required between engineers at the chip design and chip fabrication
stages. While Monteverde interprets unstructured technical dialogue as specific human capital, it can also be viewed as a proxy
for coordination costs between two stages of production. According to this interpretation, his results would indicate that
coordination costs are lowered by integration.
4
or the disutility of cost reducing efforts, the efficiency effect always dominates the control effect,
therefore the impact of technical progress on procurement does not depend on the cost differential.
The paper provides an explanation for the changing effect of technological progress on
procurement throughout the twentieth century: why it favoured vertical integration historically, and why
it favours subcontracting (or has a mixed effect) today. This explanation relies on the implication of the
evolution of the relative importance of production and coordination activities for the relationship
between technological progress and vertical integration. Namely, the model predicts that as the
coordination activities gain in importance relative to production activities (which is observed
empirically), the overall effect of technological progress (affecting the level of costs) is to favour
subcontracting over vertical integration.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the tradeoff between firms and markets is
reviewed based on transaction cost theory and agency theory. Section 3 presents the model and the
optimal contract. Section 4 discusses how different forms of technological progress affect procurement,
and section 5 concludes. The relationship between private information and social welfare in the presence
of externalities to the procurement decision is discussed in Appendix B.
2. Firms and markets
This section addresses the tradeoff between the firm and the market in terms of differences in
cost levels and in cost observability, based on transaction cost theory and agency theory.4 The first
dimension of the tradeoff between the firm and the market relates to the relative levels of coordination
and production costs under each governance mode. Consider first coordination costs. Coordination costs
include “the costs of gathering information, negotiating contracts, and protecting against the risks of
“opportunistic” bargaining.” (Malone et al., 1987). Following transaction cost theory, markets have
higher coordination costs than firms:5 supplier search costs, monitoring costs, and renegotiation hazards
(due to asset specificity, for instance) are the main transaction costs in a vertical relationship.
Difficulties in the communication of the specifications of components to suppliers constitute a typical
example of coordination costs (N. Foss, 1996).6
Assumption 1. The market has higher coordination costs than the firm.
Next, consider production costs. The transaction cost literature has tented to focus on the costs
7Riordan and Williamson (1985) study a model where markets and hierarchies have different production and transaction costs;
their analysis is centred around asset specificity.
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of opportunism, while neglecting potential differences in other types of costs.7 The central claim of
transaction cost theory, that in the absence of transaction costs the frontiers of the firm would be
indeterminate, rules out the relevance of any type of cost not classified as a transaction cost. However,
the decision to make or buy should not be merely based on the relative importance of transaction and
management costs, but should also take into account other attributes of markets and firms. One such
important attribute is production costs. As Demsetz notes:
in the ... context in which management, transaction, and production costs are all assumed to be positive, the
correct decision is reached by assessing whether merger of independent production yields the lowest unit cost,
taking all these costs into account (Demsetz, 1988:146)
[in the transaction cost literature] the make-or-buy decision is not allowed to turn on differences in production
cost (Demsetz, 1988:148)
the transaction cost theory of the firm ignores differences between firms when these lie outside the control
function and discourages a search for such differences. (Demsetz, 1988:148)
In the same token, N. Foss (1996) explains that the contractual approach assumes that the only
differences between institutions lies in control costs, not in production costs : “[the contractual approach
assumes that] production costs do not vary over firms for the ‘same’ productive tasks - that is, what one
firm can do, another firm can do equally efficient” (N. Foss, 1996:17). Chandler (1992) also adheres
to the view that “the specific nature of the firm’s facilities and skills becomes the most significant factor
in determining what will be done in the firm and what by the market” (p.86). Finally, Coase (1990)
notes that 
... once most production is carried out within firms and most transactions are firm-firm transactions and not
factor-factor transactions, the level of transaction costs will be greatly reduced and the dominant factor
determining the institutional structure of production will in general no longer be transaction costs but the
relative costs of different firms in organizing particular activities (p.11).
These critiques of the excessive focus of the transaction cost approach on incentive costs point
out that other types of costs play a role in procurement. In this paper the differences between firms and
markets regarding production costs are modelled explicitly. Namely, markets have lower production
costs than hierarchies, because of specialization and of economies of scale (Williamson, 1985), and of
the competition between suppliers (Malone et al., 1987).
Assumption 2. The firm has higher production costs than the market.
We now turn to cost observability. Transaction cost theory acknowledges that measurement
issues are important in the make-or-buy decision, but they have been relegated to a secondary position
compared with asset specificity. Measurement difficulties play an important role in our model. How
easy a cost is to observe depends on whether the activity is performed by an employee of the firm or by
an outside agent, how easy the inputs and outputs of the activity are easy to identify ex ante and measure
ex post, the possibility of collusion between agents, and whether there is a contract laying out the
activities to be performed or not.
Given that production activities are generally well specified in advance, the cost of internal
8Poppo (1995) finds that product cost information disclosure is better with internal suppliers than with external suppliers.
9Although transaction cost theory focuses on informational asymmetries in markets, those problems do not disappear with vertical
integration (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) discuss the difficulties arising from
nonseparable team outputs, whether the transaction takes place inside or outside the firm. Melumad et al. (1992) show that
centralization can induce costs due to restricted communication between the agents and the central authority. Poppo and Zenger
(1998) estimate a model of the influence of transactions’ characteristics on the performance of vertical integration versus
subcontracting of information services; they find that management satisfaction with costs decreases with measurement difficulties
both when the activity is outsourced and when it is performed in-house. Specifically, they find that measurement difficulties have
a larger negative effect on cost performance in markets than in firms, but have a larger negative effect on quality and
responsiveness in firms than in markets. Moreover, they find that measurement difficulties have no effect on whether firms
outsource or not.
The bias of transaction cost theory toward the analysis of opportunism in markets has led it to overlook opportunism problems
in the firm. However, opportunism is not the exclusivity of markets. There is a large literature on agency costs within the firm.
Olsen (1996) shows that even though vertical integration can be preferable on efficiency grounds, agency costs within the firm,
which arise from the possibility of contract renegotiation, can make the market transaction cheaper. Hennart (1993) discusses
the costs of organization in both firms and markets: the internal organization costs of firms are mainly due to shirking, which
arises because the firm relies mostly on hierarchy; while the external organization costs of markets are mainly due to cheating,
which arises because the market relies mostly on prices. Eccles and White (1988) discuss the internal transaction costs associated
with exchanges between profit centres in a multidivisional or multiprofit centre firm. Masten et al. (1991), from the study of a
large naval construction project, find that, although the costs of the market rise with the potential for holdups, internal costs play
a role in the integration decision. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) analyse the costs of influence activities in organizations. Demsetz
argues that while the market has transaction costs, internal management is not costless: “The worldly roles of management ... [are]
to explore uncertain possibilities and to control resources consciously, where owners of resources have a penchant for pursuing
their own interests” (Demsetz, 1988:143). Finally, even though this has been overlooked by most of the transaction cost literature,
Williamson (1975) notes that “the same transaction cost factors that increase the cost of market exchange may also serve to
increase the cost of internal organization ... A symmetrical analysis of trading thus requires that we acknowledge the transactional
limits of internal organization as well as the sources of market failure” (pp.8-9).
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production -which is performed by the firm’s employee- is relatively easy to observe. However, it is
more difficult to monitor external production activities, which are performed by the subcontractor.8 This
is consistent with the views of agency theory and of the property rights theory that measurement
problems are less important when the activity takes place in-house. In a property rights framework, if
the right to audit is a residual rather than a contractible right, then cost observability is superior in-house
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). While some firms may send their personnel to observe directly the
production facilities of their subcontractors, in general it will be at least as easy for the firm to observe
its internal production costs as to observe the production costs of its subcontractors. For the sake of
simplicity, it will be assumed that a cost which is easy to observe is perfectly observable while a cost
that is difficult to observe is not observable.
Assumption 3. Internal production costs are observable by the firm, while external production costs
are not.
However, it is not true for all types of activities that measurement difficulties are greater in-
house.9 Contrarily to internal production costs, internal coordination costs are difficult to observe. First,
coordination activities cannot be specified with the same degree of precision as production activities.
A production process generally has clearly identifiable inputs and outputs, but the same cannot be said
about coordination activities, which are more difficult to specify. Second, when many activities are
being performed within the firm, it is difficult to separate the costs of coordinating different activities
(this problem is less important for production costs). 
On the other hand, the costs incurred by the employee while coordinating activities with the
7subcontractor are easy to observe (the subcontractor may well have some coordination costs of her own,
but her high degree of specialization allows us to overlook those costs). First, a firm typically
coordinates a large number of activities in-house, but only a few activities on the market. Therefore the
problem of separating the coordination costs of different activities is less acute externally than
internally. Second, external transactions are regulated through contracts, which specify to a certain
extent the coordination activities of the employee of the firm. Internal coordination costs do not involve
contracts, and henceforth are not described with the same degree of precision. Third, measuring internal
coordination costs with accuracy can be complicated by collusion between supervisors and employees,
which is made easier by the long term relationship between the two parties. The employees of the firm
can act strategically and shift costs between activities (to hide inefficiencies, for example). This problem
is less acute with external costs: it is more difficult for the employees to collude with external agents
than to collude among themselves.
Assumption 4. External coordination costs are observable by the firm, while internal coordination
costs are not.
The three sources of difficulty in measuring internal coordination costs -namely, cost separation,
the absence of contracts, and collusion- are less acute with internal production costs. The relative ease
of specifying the inputs and outputs of the production process leaves little scope for the manipulation
of production cost information on the part of employees.
The following table summarizes the tradeoff between the firm and the market in terms of cost
levels and observability. “High” and “low” in this table should be read vertically, meaning that no
assumption is made on the level of production costs relative to the level of coordination costs.
Table 1 - Cost levels and observability
Production costs Coordination costs
Internal High - Observable Low - Not observable
External Low - Not observable High - Observable
3. The model
The effects of technological change on firm boundaries are addressed in a principal-two agents
model, with moral hazard and adverse selection. The model is based on LS. There are two organisations,
a firm (the buyer) and a supplier. The firm needs one unit of an input. It may make the input internally
or buy it from the supplier. There are two types of costs: production costs, and coordination costs
(examples of coordination activities are planning, communicating, analysing data, and controlling). The
firm incurs both types of costs (possibly in addition to other effort costs or information rents) whether
it makes or buys the input. Following assumptions 1 through 4, it is assumed that the firm has lower
coordination costs but higher production costs than the subcontractor, and that internal production costs
and external coordination costs are observable, while internal coordination costs and external production
costs are not. Differences between agents are due to institutional characteristics, and not to the fact that
an agent is not using the most efficient technology.
10Contrarily to the more realistic assumption that, when an agent performs more than one task, effort disutility should depend on
total effort devoted to all tasks performed by that agent (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), it is assumed that the total disutility of
the employee is additively separable in production CRE and coordination CRE.
11This model is à la Laffont-Tirole: total costs are observable, but their decomposition between innate costs and effort is not.
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(1)
Glossary
c Production cost
tc, t cD, tce Technological parameters affecting production costs
i Coordination cost
ti, t iD, tie Technological parameters affecting coordination costs
I(c),C(i) Decision functions
e(.) Cost reduction effort (CRE)
D(.) Disutility of cost reduction effort
f(.), F(.) Density and distribution functions of c and i
Ps Payment to the subcontractor
Pe Payment to the employee
Ps Transaction costs
Pe Management costs
B Profits
CRE Cost reduction effort
IT Information Technologies
The production cost of the supplier is tcc, and the production cost of the firm is tcðc. The external
coordination cost (between the two firms) is tiði , and the internal coordination cost (within the buying
firm) is tii. The stochastically independent random variables c and i are such that c,i~f(c,i), c0[c,ðc ],
i0[i,ði  ]. The joint distribution function associated with f(c,i) is F(c,i). It is assumed that F(c,i)/f(c,i) is
nondecreasing in c and i.
Both the buyer and the supplier can invest in a cost reduction effort (CRE) of either or both types
of costs. For production costs, investing ec units of effort reduces costs by tceec , and induces a disutility
tcDD(ec). For coordination costs, investing ei units of effort reduces costs by t ie ei, and induces a disutility
t iDD(ei). The disutility of cost reduction function, D(.), is the same for production and coordination costs,
for simplicity’s sake. It is assumed that D’(.)>0, D’’(.)>0, and D’’’(.)$0.10
When the firm buys the input from the supplier, it can observe the coordination cost tiði ; as for
production costs, the firm can observe their total level,11 but cannot observe which part is due to the
realization of c (the part tcc) and which part is due to the CRE of the subcontractor (the part tceec). When
the firm makes the input internally, it can observe the production cost, tcðc; as for coordination costs, the
firm can observe their total level, but cannot observe which part is due to the realization of i (the part
tii) and which part is due to the CRE of the employee (the part t ieei ). The firm knows f(c,i) and F(c,i),
however.
The firm cannot observe the CRE invested by agents, internal ec and ei, and external ec and ei.
It can only observe final production costs and final coordination costs for each agent. For internal
production costs and external coordination costs, which are non random and observable, this
nonobservability of efforts is not a problem. For those costs agents choose the optimal amounts of
effort, which are given by
12Employees don’t typically face menus of contracts (although there are some exceptions. For instance, IBM uses menus of
contracts in compensating the sales force; see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, ch.12). However, the employee can be thought of as
a division constituting a profit centre. It is not uncommon for firms to put internal divisions in competition with outside
contractors.
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(2)
Although with internal provision the employee performs two tasks, the observability of internal
production costs implies that the firm can set production CRE at any desired level costlessly
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). However, the unobservability of CRE for internal coordination costs
and external production costs implies that the firm has to induce special provisions in the contract in
order to mitigate agents’ incentives to inflate their costs.
When the employee gets the contract, the firm incurs production costs, minus the effect of
production CRE, and compensates the employee for the disutility of production CRE. As for
coordination costs, only the total of which is observable, the firm incurs the observed total cost, plus
a payment to be specified in the contract. When the subcontractor gets the contract, the firm incurs
coordination costs (even when the input is bought, it is the employee who coordinates operations
between the firm and the subcontractor), minus the effect of coordination CRE, and compensates the
employee for the disutility of coordination CRE. As for production costs, only the total of which is
observable, the firm incurs the observed total cost, plus a payment to be specified in the contract.
Collusion or side payments between the employee and the subcontractor are not possible.
Letting cT represent the final observable production costs of the subcontractor (which are the
difference between her innate production cost and her production CRE), and letting Ps represent the
payment she receives, her profit from reporting c/ when her true type is c is
Bs(c/*c) = Ps(c/,.) - tcD D ((tce)-1[tcc-cT(c/)])
where the argument of D represents the effort level required to achieve a total cost cT(c/) when the
subcontractor’s true production cost is c.
Similarly, letting iT represent the final observable coordination costs of the employee (which are
the difference between her innate coordination cost and her coordination CRE), and letting Pe represent
the payment she receives, her profit from reporting i/ when her true type is i is
Be(i/*i) = Pe(i/,.) - t iD D ((t ie)-1[tii-iT(i/)])
where the argument of D represents the effort level required to achieve a total cost iT(i/) when the
employee’s true coordination cost is i.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the employee learns the realization of i, and the
subcontractor learns the realization of c. Next, the firm announces, simultaneously: a) a menu of
payments and observed coordination costs to the employee12 {Pe(.),iT(.)} and a menu of payments and
observed production costs to the subcontractor {Ps(.),cT(.)} and b) the combinations of reports (i/,c/)
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such that self provision will be chosen, and the combinations (i/,c/) such that outsourcing will be
chosen. The firm can commit to this contract. Next, the employee makes a (public) report i/, and the
subcontractor makes a (public) report c/, simultaneously. Finally, the firm chooses the procurement
method, and efforts, production, and payments takes place.
Figure 1 - Decision sequence
       *       *            *           *     
-employee learns -firm announces: -employee reports i/ -firm chooses -efforts,
  realization of i; {Pe(.),iT(.)} -subcont. reports c/   procurement production,
-subcontractor learns {Ps(.),cT(.)}   mode and payments
  realization of c; S,S - take place
The firm aims at minimizing the sum of production and coordination costs (and information rents) by
solving the following problem:
where S represents the set such that subcontracting is chosen, and S - represents the set such that self
provision is chosen. BG s and BG e represent the reservation profits of the subcontractor and the employee,
respectively. Without loss of generality it is assumed that BG s=BG e=0.
For each agent there are three constraints: one individual rationality constraint, and two incentive
compatibility constraints. By the revelation principle we can restrict our attention to direct mechanisms.
By using a Vickrey auction, truthful revelation is a dominant strategy.
From the above representation of internal and external costs we know that a higher i increases
internal coordination costs, and has no effect on external costs. Therefore, for a given c, a higher i
increases the likelihood of outsourcing. Conversely, for a given i, a higher c increases external
production costs, with no effect on internal costs. Therefore, for a given i, a higher c increases the
likelihood of vertical integration. In sum, the firm will subcontract if, for a given c, i is higher than a
certain threshold (or, alternatively, if, for a given i, c is lower than a certain threshold). Let (c,I(c)) with
i=I(c) represent the couples (c,i) such that, for a given c, when i<I(c) the firm chooses vertical
integration, and when i>I(c) the firm chooses subcontracting, with I(c)0[i,ði  ]. Figure 2 illustrates the
simplest possible shape of I(c) (other possible shapes will be discussed shortly). To the right (left) of
I(c), the firm chooses vertical integration (outsourcing). For any c0[c,ðc ], the solution is said to be
interior when I(c)0(i,ði  ), and is said to be a boundary solution when I(c)0{i,ði  }. Most cases are such that
I(c) has both interior and boundary parts. I consider cases where at least part of the solution is interior,
i.e. configurations such that there exists c0[c,ðc ] such that I(c)0(i,ði  ).
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[Figure 2 here]
The decision criterion was characterized above as a critical level of i that, for a given c, separates
the two procurement modes. In what follows it will sometimes be useful to study the solution in the
inverse form, that is, to find the critical level of c for a given i. However, the function I(c) is not
monotonically increasing, hence the inverse function I-1(i) does not always exist. Because I’(c)>0 over
all c such that I(c)0(I(c),I(ðc )), it follows that I-1(i) exists for all i such that i0(I(c),I(ðc)). However I-1(i)
does not exist at boundary solutions.
With this caution in mind we now characterize the inverse decision problem. Let c=C(i)
represent, for a given i, the critical threshold of c separating the two procurement modes. Then it is
easily seen that C(i) can be characterized as follows:
1) C(i*i#I(c)) = max {c * ò c+0[c,ðc ] * I(c+)<I(c)};
2) C(i*i$I(ðc )) = min {c * ò c+0[c,ðc ] * I(c+)>I(c)};
3) C(i*i0(I(c),I(ðc ))) = I-1(i), where I-1(i) is the local inverse of I(c) over I(c)0(i,ði  ).
Parts 1 and 2 of the definition account for the fact that some parts of I(c) may be boundary solutions.
Part 3 uses the fact that I(c) is monotonically increasing over its interior part.
Payments to the agents are derived in the Appendix A, and are shown to be as follows:
Each agent, when she performs a task on which rent extraction is possible (i.e. for which the type of the
agent is unobservable), gets reimbursed for the disutility of CRE, plus a rent. The information rent of
the subcontractor depends on her production costs, but not on external coordination costs, since the
latter are known. Conversely, the information rent of the employee depends on her coordination costs,
and not on her production costs, since the latter are known.
Due to competition between the employee and the subcontractor, the rent of the agent who gets
the contract is truncated according to the efficiency of the agent who does not get the contract (following
Laffont and Tirole, 1987). This explains why the payment to each agent, and not only the choice of
procurement, depends on the cost realizations of both agents. The particularity of the mechanism used
here is that each agent’s type is defined over a different dimension.
Although technically speaking the model has two types of costs, c and i, from an economic point
of view it incorporates four types of costs: production, coordination, management, and transaction
13We use the term transaction cost to denote the cost of opportunism in market relations. Following Demsetz (1988) we use the
term management cost to represent the cost of opportunism within the firm (actually, Demsetz uses the term management cost
to represent the cost of organising resources within firms).
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costs.13 Production costs are the direct -internal or external- costs of producing the input. Coordination
costs are the direct -internal or external- coordination costs. Transaction costs arise because of the
private information of the subcontractor. In Appendix A it is shown that transaction costs are
Management costs arise because of the private information of the employee. In Appendix A it is shown
that management costs are
Table 2 shows the decomposition of costs under each procurement mode.
Table 2 - Decomposition of costs under different procurement modes
Vertical integration Subcontracting
Production costs tcðc-tcee c*+t cDD(e c* ) tcc-tceec(c)+t cDD(ec )
Coordination costs tii-tieei(i)+t iDD(e i ) tiði -tiee i*+t iDD(e i* )
Information rents (tit iD/tie)D’(ei )(F(ðc,i)/fi(i)) (tct cD/tce)D’(ec)(F(c,ði )/fc(c))
From (25) in Appendix A the problem of the firm can be rewritten as
The nonobservability of effort levels forces the firm to design contracts inducing agents to
choose effort levels maximizing the expected profit of the firm. The effort level that the firm induces
an agent to choose is independent of the number of agents (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). The choice of ei
by the employee must satisfy
Comparing this choice with the optimal level of coordination CRE, chosen by the employee when the
subcontractor is given the contract, and given by (1), shows that ei<e i*. When the input is made
internally, the employee is induced to invest less than the optimal amount in coordination cost reduction
in order to limit her rents. From (5) it is clear that the rents of the employee increase with its
14Helper (1991) finds that in the Auto industry, the unwillingness of suppliers to provide buyers with detailed cost information
makes the implementation of cost reduction practices difficult.
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coordination CRE. Whereas with internal provision the employee invests the optimal amount, because
she enjoys no rents on coordination costs.
The choice of ec by the subcontractor must satisfy
Comparing this choice with the optimal level of production costs reduction efforts, chosen by the
employee and given by (2), shows that ec<ec*. The subcontractor is induced to invest less than the
optimal amount in production cost reduction14 in order to limit her rents. From (4) it is clear that the
rents of the subcontractor increase with its production CRE. Whereas the employee invests the optimal
amount, because she enjoys no rents on production costs.
Regarding production costs, the subcontractor spends too little on cost reduction, while the
employee spends the optimal amount on cost reduction. Regarding coordination costs, the employee
spends the optimal amount on cost reduction when the input is bought, while she spends too little on
coordination cost reduction when the input is made internally. These distortions will be important in
the analysis of changes in the technology of CRE.
Note that Bf is concave in I(c):
Therefore for I(c) to be optimally chosen, the following must be true at an interior solution: 
(12) implies that on the interior parts of I(c) the firm equates the total costs of internal and external
provision. Figures 3a through 3d illustrate different possible shapes of I(c). I(c) need not necessarily
pass through the coordinates (c,i) or (ðc,ði  ). Moreover, I(c) need not be (and is generally not) linear;
however, for simplicity, all graphical representations of I(c) will be linear. When i=I(c)0(i,ði  ), the firm
chooses randomly between subcontracting and self-provision. When i=I(c)=i, the firm chooses
subcontracting. When i=I(c)=ði , the firm chooses vertical integration.
15The case where an agent obtains the contract irrespective of all cost realizations, which would yield a solution entirely on the
boundaries of the parameter space, is without interest, and is therefore not considered here.
16All proofs are in Appendix A.
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[Figure 3 here]
At an interior solution of I(c), MBf /MI(c)=0: the (virtual) costs of internal provision and the
(virtual) costs of subcontracting are equalized. Boundary solutions obtain when one agent is so favoured
(by technological parameters, for instance) that, for some (but not all) of its cost realizations,15 she
obtains the contract, irrespective of the cost realization of the other agent. At I(c)=i, MBf /MI(c)<0: the
costs of vertical integration are strictly higher than the costs of subcontracting. Therefore the firm sets
I(c) as low as possible. In this case the subcontractor is so attractive that even very low internal
coordination costs cannot induce vertical integration. At I(c)=ði , MBf /MI(c)>0: the costs of vertical
integration are strictly lower than the costs of subcontracting. Therefore the firm sets I(c) as high as
possible. In this case the employee is so attractive that no matter how low the production costs of the
subcontractor turn out to be, the subcontractor cannot get the contract.
The private information of agents causes the firm’s decision criterion to differ from what would
prevail in a world with symmetric information. The private information of the employee on internal
coordination costs induces the firm to use internal procurement less often (by setting I(c) lower), and
to distort the coordination CRE of the employee downward. Similarly, the private information of the
subcontractor on production costs leads the firm to use subcontracting less often (by setting I(c) higher),
and to distort the production CRE of the subcontractor downward.
The following lemmas characterise the decision of the firm when there is only one cost
dimension. They will be useful in the analysis of comparative statics.
Lemma 1.16 When there are no production costs (tc=tce=tcD=0), the firm subcontracts if i>i’ and makes
the input itself if i<i’, i’[i,ði  ].
Lemma 2. When there are no coordination costs (ti=t ie=t iD=0), the firm subcontracts if c<c’ and makes
the input itself if c>c’, c’[c,ðc ].
(The decision rule described in lemma 2 is the same as the decision rule of the LS model.)
From (12) let 
We have that a(c’)=0: at c’ internal and external production costs are equalized. Similarly,
b(i’)=0: at i’ internal and external coordination costs are equalized. We wish to see how I(c) is related
17Hubbard (1998) distinguishes between the incentive and coordination benefits of IT. Here technological progress in IT (changes
in ti, tie, or t iD) represents coordination benefits, but has an indirect effect on incentives.
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to i’ and c’. We know that a(c’)=0 and b(i’)=0. Now, (12)Y a(c)+b(I(c))=0 Y a(c’)+b(I(c’))=0 Y
I(c’)=i’. Moreover, a’(c)>0 and b’(i)<0, implying that I(c>c’)>i’ and I(c<c’)<i’. Figure 4 illustrates
these features. This figure shows that I(c) has to pass through the coordinate (c’,i’). Moreover, I(c)
cannot be found in the southeast or northwest rectangles on that figure, because in those areas one agent
has an advantage in the total cost of both production and coordination activities over the other agent.
[Figure 4 here]
4. Comparative statics
We now wish to assert the effect of technological progress on the decision of the firm, which
is characterised by I(c). There are six types of technical progress: a reduction in production costs
(decline in tc), a reduction in coordination costs (decline in ti ), an increase in the impact of production
CRE (increase in tce ), an increase in the impact of coordination CRE (increase in t ie), a decline in the
disutility of production CRE (decline in tcD), and a decline in the disutility of coordination CRE (decline
in t iD).17
One characteristic of progress in either production or information technologies is that it often
affects both the market and the firm (see the introduction). The question is: which effect is more
important, and how is the procurement decision affected? To answer that question we focus the analysis
on symmetric technical change, which affects the firm and the subcontractor proportionally. The effects
of non symmetric technical change may differ.
All comparative statics are evaluated at the interior parts of I(c). However, the shift of the
interior portion of I(c) provides unambiguous inferences about the shift of its boundary parts (if any).
Table 3 shows how different types of costs are affected by changes in the parameters. Realizations of
i and c are random. Changes in the technological parameters tx denote technical progress.
Table 3 - Effect of an increase in parameters on costs
External costs Internal costs
Production Coordination Transaction Production Coordination Management
i 0 0 0 0 + +
c + 0 + 0 0 0
-tc, -tcD, or tce - 0 - - 0 0
-ti, -t iD, or tie 0 - 0 0 - -
From (11) and (12) we have that 
18Whereas in the LS model technological change induced two effects, an efficiency effect and a control effect, here we need to
distinguish between two types of efficiency effects: production efficiency effects and coordination efficiency effects, and two
types of control effects: production control effects and coordination control effects.
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where " stands for any parameter of the model. This equality will be used throughout the paper.
4.1 Decline in production and coordination costs
Consider first the decline in production costs.
Proposition 1. Let the unique c*0(c’,ðc ] be characterized by the implicit function
Then
a) if I(c*)<ði , so that very inefficient subcontractors can obtain the contract, then dI(c)/dtc <>0: a decline
in production costs induces more vertical integration in the interval c0[c,c*), and more subcontracting
in the interval c0(c*,ðc ];
b) if I(c*)=ði , so that very inefficient subcontractors cannot obtain the contract, then dI(c)/dtc<0: a
decline in production costs induces more vertical integration.
The impact of a decline in tc can be decomposed into the production efficiency effect and the
production control effect.18 The production efficiency effect comes from the fact that the reduction in
tc reduces the costs of the firm more than the costs of the subcontractor, because the firm’s production
costs are initially higher. The production control effect is due to the fact that the reduction in tc reduces
the information rent of the subcontractor, because an initial difference in costs becomes less important
with the decline in tc. The production efficiency effect induces more internal provision, whereas the
production control effect induces more subcontracting. The net impact depends on which effect
dominates. 
Figure 5 shows the possible shifts in I(c) following a decline in tc, depending on the initial
position of I(c). Before technical progress the decision function was the old I(c). Figure 5a illustrates
the case where the decline in tc shifts the decision function to the left (more vertical integration, because
the efficiency effect dominates) for c<c*, and to the right (more outsourcing, because the control effect
dominates) for c>c*. The critical c* is where the old and new I(c) functions cross (when they do), i.e.
where the efficiency and control effects cancel out. Figure 5b illustrates the case where the decline in
tc shifts the decision function to the left (more vertical integration). In all cases the new function passes
through the new coordinate (c’’,i’).
[Figure 5 here]
When c<c*, the production cost differential between the firm and the market is substantial,
therefore the firm benefits substantially more from the decline in tc, implying that the efficiency effect
-which induces more vertical integration- is important. Also, for that level of cost the control effect is
negligible, because there are relatively few subcontractors more efficient than that subcontractor, hence
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the reduction in rents is secondary. Therefore the production efficiency effect dominates and the decline
in tc leads to more vertical integration. This result obtains on both figures 5a and 5b.
For c>c*, the production cost differential between the firm and the market is negligible,
therefore the efficiency effect is small. At the same time, the control effect is important, because there
is a large number of subcontractors below that subcontractor. Therefore the control effect dominates,
and the decline in tc leads to more subcontracting. This effect obtains on figure 5a, but does not obtain
on figure 5b.
The difference between figures 5a and 5b is that on figure 5a, I(ðc-g)<ði , meaning that all
subcontractors can obtain the contract, whereas on figure 5b, I(ðc-g)=ði , meaning that some
subcontractors never obtain the contract. When very inefficient subcontractors cannot get the contract,
the efficiency effect may never become small enough, and the control effect may never become large
enough, for the control effect to dominate, and for more subcontracting to be induced. Part b of
proposition 1 (which corresponds to the case depicted in figure 5b) indicates that a sufficient condition
for the efficiency effect to dominate everywhere (and therefore for more vertical integration to be
induced everywhere) is that I(c*)=ði : the decision function is such that the subcontractor for which the
efficiency and control effects would have cancelled out never obtains the contract.
The result of proposition 1b is more likely to hold than the result of proposition 1a in one
important case: when production costs are significantly quantitatively more important than coordination
costs. In that case there exists c+<ðc such that I(c+)=ði : very inefficient employees can get the contract,
but very inefficient subcontractors cannot. In other words, the firm accepts very high coordination costs
in order to avoid high production costs, because of the quantitative importance of production costs.
From proposition 1 we see that this asymmetry corresponds to the case b, where very inefficient
subcontractors cannot get the contract. Therefore when the asymmetry between production and
coordination costs is sufficiently pronounced, the decline in production costs induces more vertical
integration everywhere.
In the LS model the production efficiency effect always dominates, and a decline in tc induces
more vertical integration unambiguously. The possible dominance of the production control effect in
this model is due to the change in the decision criterion, which in turn is due to the presence of
coordination costs. While for a given c, coordination costs do not affect the relative importance of the
production efficiency effect and the production control effect, they determine at which levels of c those
effects are evaluated, and therefore they affect the impact of a decline in tc. In the LS model (described
by lemma 2), the subcontractor cannot get the contract if c>c’. Here, this is possible, because a high i
increases internal costs, and encourages subcontracting. As c increases, the production efficiency effect
diminishes (this is clear from (27)). When the production cost advantage of the subcontractor is
sufficiently small, the production efficiency effect -which induces vertical integration- may be
dominated by the production control effect -which induces subcontracting. The presence of coordination
costs affects the impact of technical progress regarding production costs.
At c’ the efficiency effect dominates because of distortions in the subcontractor’s production
CRE compared to the employee’s (LS). At c’, internal and external production costs are equal. Because
the cost of production CRE is higher under subcontracting, the difference between total production costs
and production CRE costs is larger under vertical integration. Therefore the firm’s production costs are
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reduced by more than those of the subcontractor (LS). However, when c>c’, external production costs
are higher than internal production costs, therefore the distortion in the subcontractor’s ec does not imply
that the difference between total production costs and production CRE costs is larger under vertical
integration.
Consider now the impact of a technical progress reducing coordination costs. Such progress can
be due to the adoption of systems with better compatibility, or a more open/flexible technology.
Proposition 2. Let the unique i*0(i’,ði  ] be characterized by the implicit function
Then
a) if I-1(i*)<ðc, so that very inefficient employees can obtain the contract, then dI(c)/dti <>0: a decline in
coordination costs induces more subcontracting in the interval i0[i,i*), and more vertical integration
in the interval i0(i*,ði  ];
b) if I-1(i*)=ðc, so that very inefficient employees cannot obtain the contract, then dI(c)/dti >0: a decline
in coordination costs induces more subcontracting.
The impact of a decline in ti can be decomposed into the coordination efficiency effect and the
coordination control effect. The coordination efficiency effect comes from the fact that the reduction
in ti reduces the costs of the subcontractor more than the costs of the firm, because the subcontractor’s
coordination costs are initially higher. The coordination control effect comes from the fact that the
reduction in ti reduces the information rent of the employee, because an initial difference in costs
becomes less important with the decline in ti. The coordination efficiency effect induces more
subcontracting, whereas the coordination control effect induces more vertical integration. The net
impact depends on which effect dominates.
Figure 6 shows the possible shifts in I(c) following a decline in ti, depending on the initial
position of I(c). Before technical progress the decision function was the old I(c). Figure 6a illustrates
the case where the decline in ti shifts the decision function to the right (more subcontracting, because
the efficiency effect dominates) for i<i*, and to the left (more vertical integration, because the control
effect dominates) for i>i*. The critical i* is where the old and new I(c) functions cross (when they do),
i.e. where the efficiency and control effects cancel out. Figure 6b illustrates the case where the decline
in ti shifts the decision function to the right (more subcontracting). In all cases the new function passes
through the new coordinate (c’,i’’).
[Figure 6 here]
When i<i*, the coordination cost differential between the firm and the market is substantial,
therefore the market benefits substantially more from the decline in ti, implying that the efficiency effect
-which induces more subcontracting- is important. Also, for that level of cost the control effect is
negligible, because there are relatively few employees more efficient than that employee, therefore the
reduction in rents is secondary. Therefore the coordination efficiency effect dominates and the decline
in ti leads to more subcontracting. This result obtains on both figures 6a and 6b.
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For i>i*, the coordination cost differential between the firm and the market is negligible,
therefore the efficiency effect is small. At the same time, the control effect is important, because there
is a large number of employees below that employee. Therefore the control effect dominates, and the
decline in ti leads to more vertical integration. This effect obtains on figure 6a, but does not obtain on
figure 6b.
The difference between figures 6a and 6b is that on figure 6a, I(ðc )=ði , meaning that all
employees can obtain the contract, whereas on figure 6b, I(ðc )<ði , meaning that some employees never
obtain the contract. When very inefficient employees cannot get the contract, the efficiency effect may
never become small enough, and the control effect may never become large enough, for the control
effect to dominate, and for more vertical integration to be induced. Part b of proposition 2 (which
corresponds to the case depicted in figure 6b) indicates that a sufficient condition for the efficiency
effect to dominate everywhere (and therefore for more subcontracting to be induced everywhere) is that
I-1(i*)=ðc: the decision function is such that the employee for which the efficiency and control effects
would have cancelled out never obtains the contract.
Consider the implication of the asymmetry between production and coordination costs
mentioned above for the impact of a decline in ti. From proposition 2 we see that this asymmetry implies
that case a is more likely, and therefore the decline in ti is more likely to induce a rotation of I(c) than
a parallel shift: less vertical integration for efficient employees, and more vertical integration for
inefficient employees. 
Note the asymmetry between the impact of a decline in tc and the impact of a decline in ti when
production costs are quantitatively more important than coordination costs: when production costs
decline, more vertical integration is induced everywhere; when coordination costs decline, the impact
depends on the coordination cost differential between the firm and the market.
The impact of progress in information (or coordination) technology can be understood in light
of the analysis of Malone et al. (1987), who argue that even if progress in IT benefits the firm and the
market, it will favour the market, because it is on this dimension (coordination costs) that the market
is weak. In terms of the model, Malone et al. consider the coordination efficiency effect. However, as
the model shows, the coordination efficiency effect is only part of the story, because of the private
information of agents (the coordination control effect), and because of the presence of other types of
costs.
The effect of IT can also be interpreted in light of the work of Hubbard (1998) and Baker and
Hubbard (2000). They find that the benefits of IT in the trucking industry vary with the nature of the
transaction: they are more coordination related under spot markets, and more incentive related under
long term contracts or vertical arrangements. Changes in technology improving coordination lead to
smaller firms, while changes in technology improving incentives lead to larger firms. These results are
consistent with the model. In the model, from an incentive point of view, IT reduce internal rents, while
they reduce external coordination costs more than internal coordination costs.
4.2 Improvements in the technology of cost reduction
Consider now the impacts of technological progress that improves the technology of cost
19Without loss of generality, the graphical representation of comparative statics results starts from a case where I(c) passes through
the coordinates (c,i) and (ðc,ði  ). However, this presentation is used only for convenience, and is in no way implied by the analytical
results.
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reduction. This can take the form of either an improvement in the effect of, or a decline in the disutility
of CRE. It turns out that these two types of technical progress have the same (qualitative) effect.
Consider first the impact of an improvement in the technology of production CRE.
Proposition 3. (dI(c)/dtcD<0; dI(c)/dtce>0). For D’’’ sufficiently small, a decline in the disutility of
production cost reduction efforts, or an increase in the impact of production cost reduction efforts
induces more vertical integration.
The decline in tcD represents a decline in the disutility of production costs reduction. Because the
firm invests more in production cost reduction than the subcontractor, the firm benefits more from this
decrease. This is the production efficiency effect, which induces more vertical integration. However,
the information rent of the subcontractor decreases when tcD decreases, because the initial cost
disadvantage of the firm is more easily compensated for by the firm investing more in production cost
reduction. This is the production control effect, which favours outsourcing. The production efficiency
effect dominates, inducing more vertical integration. 
An increase in tce represents an increase in the impact of CRE. The increase in tce benefits the firm
more, because it invests more in production cost reduction. This is the production efficiency effect,
which favours vertical integration. At the same time, the increase in tce reduces the information rent of
the supplier, because it becomes easier for the firm to compensate for its initial cost disadvantage. This
is the production control effect, which favours outsourcing. The production efficiency effect dominates,
inducing more vertical integration. 
Figure 7 illustrates the shift in I(c) following a decline in tcD or an increase in tce.19 The shift in I(c)
is stronger when c is high, because the distortion in the subcontractor’s efforts increases with c.
[Figure 7 here]
Consider next the impact of an improvement in the technology of coordination CRE.
Proposition 4. (dI(c)/dt iD>0; dI(c)/dtie<0). For D’’’ sufficiently small, a decline in the disutility of
coordination cost reduction efforts, or an increase in the impact of coordination cost reduction efforts
induces more outsourcing.
The decline in t iD represents a decline in the disutility of coordination costs reduction. Because
coordination CRE are higher under external provision, the subcontractor benefits more from this
decrease. This is the coordination efficiency effect, which induces more outsourcing. However, the
information rent of the employee decreases when t iD decreases, because the initial cost disadvantage of
the subcontractor is more easily compensated for by the subcontractor investing more in cost reduction.
This is the coordination control effect, which favours vertical integration. The coordination efficiency
effect dominates, inducing more outsourcing.
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An increase in t ie represents an increase in the impact of CRE. The increase in t ie benefits the
subcontractor more, because coordination CRE are higher under subcontracting. This is the coordination
efficiency effect, which favours subcontracting. At the same time, the increase in t ie reduces the
information rent of the employee, because it becomes easier for the subcontractor to compensate for its
initial cost disadvantage. This is the coordination control effect, which favours vertical integration. The
coordination efficiency effect dominates, inducing more outsourcing. 
Figure 8 illustrates the shift in I(c) following a decline in t iD or an increase in t ie. The shift in I(c)
is stronger when i is high, because the distortion in the employee’s efforts increases with i.
[Figure 8 here]
In contrast to changes in tc or ti, which have mixed effects on procurement, changes in tce, tcD, t ie,
or t iD have unambiguous effects. Consider the case where technical progress affects the level of costs
(tc or ti ). When the cost differential between the firm and the market is at its maximum, there is no
control effect (because in that case there are no agents more efficient than that agent), there is only an
efficiency effect. When the cost differential is nil, there is no efficiency effect, there is only a control
effect. Therefore the impact of technical progress on procurement depends on the cost differential.
Consider now the case where technical progress concerns the effect or the disutility of CRE (tce,
tcD, t ie, or t iD). In that case, when the cost differential is at its maximum, there is no efficiency effect
(because the privately informed agent with a low cost invests the optimal amount of CRE), and there
is no control effect. When the cost differential is nil, or that it is positive but not at its maximum, there
is an efficiency effect (because in that case the privately informed agent invests a suboptimal amount
of CRE), and there is a control effect (because technical progress reduces the rents of all agents who
might be more efficient than that agent); in that case the efficiency effect always dominates. Therefore
the impact of technical progress does not depend on the cost differential between the firm and the
market.
4.3 Simultaneous change in more than one technological parameter
In many situations technical change affects many aspects of the technology simultaneously.
Consider the case where all technological parameters concerning a given type of cost change
simultaneously. Consider first production costs. Let the technological parameters regarding production
costs be as follows: Tctc ,Tctce ,TctcD, with Tc >0. What would be the impact of a simultaneous and equi-
proportional change in all these parameters? This would correspond to a case where innate costs decline
(tc declines), and there is a new cost reduction technology that is less costly (tcD declines) but also less
effective (tce declines). 
Proposition 5. (dI(c)/dTc <>0). A decline in production costs, parallelled by the adoption of a production
cost reduction technology that is less costly, but also less effective, induce more vertical integration
when the production cost differential is large (c<c’), and induce more outsourcing when the production
cost differential is small (c>c’).
Figure 9 illustrates the shift in I(c) resulting from a decline in Tc. For this type of technological
change there is no control effect, there is only an efficiency effect, therefore technological change
20A similar result obtains when tc declines (see figure 5).
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favours the procurement mode with higher total production costs. Consider the portion of I(c) that shifts
to the left, with c<c’. At this level of cost the total production costs of the subcontractor are lower than
the firm’s, implying that the reduction in production costs is more important for the firm, inducing more
vertical integration. Consider now the portion of I(c) that shifts to the right, with c>c’. At this level of
cost the total production costs of the subcontractor are higher than the firm’s, implying that the
reduction in production costs is more important for the subcontractor, inducing more outsourcing. At
c’ internal and external production costs are equal, therefore there is no change in the decision criterion:
the new I(c) passes through (c’,i’).
[Figure 9 here]
Moreover the decline in Tc reduces the importance of production costs in explaining firm
boundaries. Figure 9 shows that the decline in Tc reduces I’(c). As I’(c) decreases, c becomes less
important, and i more important, in the procurement decision. In the limit case where I’(c)60 (because
Tc60), procurement depends only on i, and is independent of c. For instance, more vertical integration
is induced when c<c’;20 because I(c<c’)<i’, in that case the low coordination costs of the employee
encourage vertical integration. Similarly, more outsourcing is induced when c>c’; because I(c>c’)>i’,
in that case the high coordination costs of the employee also encourage outsourcing. When technology
changes, it may be factors for which technology is not changing, rather than factors for which
technology is changing, which explain better the change in firms’ boundaries.
In the same fashion the impact of a simultaneous and equi-proportional change in all
technological parameters concerning coordination costs is determined. Let the technological parameters
regarding coordination costs be as follows: Ti ti , Ti t ie , Ti t iD, with Ti >0. What would be the impact of
a simultaneous and equi-proportional change in all these parameters? 
Proposition 6. (dI(c)/dTi <>0). A decline in coordination costs, parallelled by the adoption of a
coordination cost reduction technology that is less costly, but also less effective, induce more
outsourcing for i<i’, induce more vertical integration for i>i’, and have no effect for i=i’.
Figure 10 illustrates the shift in I(c) following a decline in Ti. Consider the portion of I(c) that
shifts to the right, with i<i’. At this level of cost the total coordination costs of the firm are lower than
the subcontractor’s, implying that the reduction in coordination costs is more important for the
subcontractor, inducing more outsourcing. Consider now the portion of I(c) that shifts to the left, with
i>i’. At this level of cost the total coordination costs of the firm are higher than the subcontractor’s,
implying that the reduction in coordination costs is more important for the firm, thus inducing more
vertical integration. For this type of technological change there is no control effect, there is only an
efficiency effect, therefore technological change favours the procurement mode with higher total
coordination costs.
[Figure 10 here]
Moreover the decline in Ti reduces the importance of coordination costs in explaining firm
21A similar result obtains when ti declines (see figure 6).
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boundaries. Figure 10 shows that the decline in Ti increases I’(c). As I’(c) increases, i becomes less
important, and c more important, in the procurement decision. In the limit case where I’(c)64 (because
Ti60), procurement depends only on c, and is independent of i. For instance, more outsourcing is
induced when i<i’;21 because C(i<i’)<c’, in that case the low production costs of the subcontractor
encourage outsourcing. Similarly, more vertical integration is induced when i>i’; because C(i>i’)>c’,
in that case the high production costs of the subcontractor also encourage vertical integration. 
It is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the impact of a decline in costs on the
extent of use of one type of procurement, which depends on the shift in the decision function, and, on
the other hand, the impact of a decline in costs on the importance of that type of cost in the procurement
decision, which is determined by the slope of the decision function. For instance, a decline in Ti reduces
the importance of coordination costs in the procurement decision (by increasing the slope of the decision
function in the space (c,i)), but we cannot say whether it leads to more subcontracting or more internal
provision (see proposition 6). Similarly, a decline in Tc reduces the importance of production costs in
the procurement decision (by decreasing the slope of the decision function in the space (c,i)), but we
cannot say whether it leads to more subcontracting or more internal provision (see proposition 5).
In light of this analysis, Coase (1990) is right when he points out that once transaction costs are
minimized, they become less important in the procurement decision. The model shows that
technological progress can have an impact similar to that pointed out by Coase. However, Malone et
al. (1987) are only partly right when they argue that, because the reduction in coordination costs reduces
the importance of the coordination cost dimension, and that markets are weak on this dimension, this
should lead to more subcontracting. Our analysis shows that this is true when the coordination cost
advantage of the firm is important, so that the efficiency effect dominates the control effect. However,
when the coordination cost advantage of the firm is negligible, the control effect may dominate, and the
decline in coordination costs can lead to more vertical integration.
Consider now a simultaneous change in all technological parameters. Let the technological
parameters be Ttc,Ttce,TtcD, Tti, Tt ie, Tt iD, with T>0.
Proposition 7. (dI(c)/dT=0). A simultaneous and equi-proportional change in all technological
parameters has no effect on procurement.
In the LS model a proportional technical change in all technological parameters (which
concerned only production costs) had no effect on procurement. Here, however, the neutrality of this
form of technical change does not obtain. When either technological parameters of production costs,
or technological parameters of coordination costs change, procurement is affected. The no effect case
obtains only when all technological parameters, for both production and coordination costs, change
simultaneously. Given that technological change affecting different types of costs generally occurs
sequentially rather than simultaneously, this neutrality is unlikely to be observed in practice, and we can
expect technological change to affect procurement more often than not.
Finally, to evaluate the effects technical progress, it is necessary to examine factors which are
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not affected by technical progress. This result was illustrated in the model in two ways. First, when
technological change affects one type of cost, it may reduce the importance of this type of cost in the
determination of procurement type, increasing the importance of other factors, for which technology has,
in fact, not changed. Second, through their impact on the relative importance of efficiency and control
effects, costs not affected by technical change can influence the way procurement responds to
technological change.
Table 4 summarizes the comparative statics of the model.
Table 4 - Summary of comparative statics
Type of technical change Cost differential
(when relevant)
Effect
Decline in production costs Low
High
More vertical integration
More outsourcing
Decline in coordination costs Low
High
More outsourcing
More vertical integration
Improvement in technology of production cost-reducing efforts More vertical integration
Improvement in technology of coordination cost-reducing efforts More outsourcing
Overhaul of production technology Low
High
More vertical integration
More outsourcing
Overhaul of coordination technology Low
High
More outsourcing
More vertical integration
Overhaul of both technologies Nil
4.4 Evolution of the effect of technological progress on procurement over time
The results provide an explanation for the changing effect of technological progress on
procurement throughout the twentieth century: why it favoured vertical integration historically, and why
it favours subcontracting (or has a mixed effect) today. This explanation relies on the evolution of the
relative importance of production and coordination activities, and on its implication for the efficiency
and control effects proposed by the model. For the purpose of this discussion we focus on technological
progress inducing a decline in (production and coordination) costs (section 4.1).
There is ample empirical evidence that over the last decades the importance of activities such
as design, quality control, etc. has increased relative to the mere production of goods. Today’s
production processes are characterized by shorter production runs, just in time inventories, and the use
of more flexible technologies. O’Farrell et al. (1993) find that business service purchases increased due
to an expansion in the demand for services, and not to a displacement of services form manufacturing
to the service sector. McFetridge and Smith (1988) note that in most industrialised countries, service
purchases by industries have increased significantly relatively to wages and to GDP between 1961 and
1981. Empey (1988) finds that there is an increase in the intensity of service inputs (defined as the total
contribution of services -in-house and outsourced- to the final product). Such activities typically involve
interaction between a larger number of workers/departments/firms, and require a higher degree of
coordination than pure production activities. From that perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the
22If this explanation is valid across time, then it is also valid in comparing industries. The effect of the same technological progress
will differ between industries characterized by different proportions of production and coordination activities.
23There is no contradiction between the asymmetry considered here, where coordination costs become relatively more important
over time, and the asymmetry considered in section 4.1, where at a given point in time production costs are quantitatively more
important than coordination costs.
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share of coordination activities (or costs) in the total activities (or costs) of firms has increased.
The model predicts that such an evolution has a direct impact on the effect of technological
progress on procurement, in a way that is consistent with the empirical evidence. More importantly, the
model can explain how changes in production and information technologies can have a different impact
today on firm boundaries compared to their impact several decades ago.
Earlier technological developments seem to have encouraged vertical integration, while more
recent ones tend to favour subcontracting, or at best have a mixed effect on procurement. Consider first
IT. On the one hand, early developments in IT (e.g. the telegraph) induced an increase in firm size at
the end of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century (Chandler, 1977). On the other hand,
recent developments in IT are more often associated with an increase in outsourcing (this issue has been
extensively discussed in the introduction). Similarly, earlier developments in production technology
favoured large firms, while more recent progress has had a mixed effect.
These trends are in fact consistent with the predictions of the model. The model predicts that
when production costs are important relative to coordination costs (so that inefficient subcontractors
cannot obtain the contract, even when the market coordination costs turn out to be low, because these
are insignificant compared to production costs), progress in production technology favours vertical
integration, while progress in IT has a mixed effect (propositions 1b and 2a). When, on the other hand,
the importance of coordination activities increases (so that inefficient subcontractors can obtain the
contract, when the internal coordination costs -which are important in the firm’s decision- turn out to
be high), progress in production technology has a mixed effect, while progress in IT induces more
subcontracting (propositions 1a and 2b). Over time, the (theoretical) effect of progress in production
technology has gone from favouring vertical integration to mixed, while the effect of progress in IT has
gone from mixed to favouring subcontracting. Overall, thus, as coordination activities gain in
importance, there is a tendency for technological progress to favour outsourcing over vertical
integration. This prediction of the model is corroborated by the empirical evidence described above: the
importance of coordination activities has increased, and technological progress seems to favour
outsourcing more than before.22 23
4.5 Competition and monitoring
In this section we discuss informally the predictions of the model regarding the effects of
changes in the level of competition between suppliers and of improvements in monitoring technologies,
on the decision criterion of the firm and on the effect of technological change on that decision criterion.
The static effects of better monitoring or increased competition between suppliers on the level of
vertical integration differ from their dynamic effects on the impact of technical change.
Consider first competition. Consider the impact of introducing competitive bidding between
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subcontractors (while maintaining a single internal division). This would have the direct effect of
increasing the level of subcontracting, by reducing the expected production cost and the rents of the
selected subcontractor. 
However, this increase in competition would also have an indirect impact on the impact of
technological progress on the procurement decision. For technical progress regarding the level of
production costs, this change would increase the production efficiency effect (by reducing the expected
c, thus increasing the production cost differential in favour of the subcontractor) and would reduce the
production control effect (by reducing the rent of the selected subcontractor). These two effects
compound to make it more likely that progress in production technology leads to more vertical
integration when there is competition between subcontractors. As for technical progress regarding the
level of coordination costs, competition between subcontractors would reduce the coordination control
effect (by reducing the expected rent of the employee), and would have no impact on the coordination
efficiency effect. This translates into a greater likelihood that progress in IT leads to more
subcontracting. Therefore the model predicts that the higher competition is between subcontractors, the
more likely it is that progress in production (coordination) technology will lead to more vertical
integration (subcontracting). This dynamic effect of competition differs from its static effect, which is
to induce more subcontracting.
Consider next monitoring. Some of the effects of IT on monitoring were discussed in the
introduction. While the model does not incorporate a monitoring technology (the focus being on
production and coordination costs), it provides insights as to the effects of a general improvement in
monitoring. Monitoring would make it more difficult for agents to misreport their types. This would
have the effect of reducing internal coordination rents and external production rents, essentially (see
assumptions 3 and 4). This could affect the procurement decision either way. However, if production
costs are quantitatively more important than coordination costs, the reduction in external costs will be
more important, and this will lead to more subcontracting. Therefore the model can explain how a
reduction in monitoring costs both inside and outside the firm, and for both production and coordination
costs, leads to more subcontracting.
At the same time, monitoring would change the impact of technical progress. By reducing the
rents of the agents, improved monitoring would reduce control effects. It follows that technical change
on production (coordination) costs is more likely to lead to more vertical integration (subcontracting)
under a better monitoring technology. Again, the static and dynamic effects of monitoring differ.
5. Conclusions
The model studied in this paper explained how, in a world of uncertainty and asymmetric
information, different types of technological change regarding production and coordination costs affect
the boundaries of the firm. It was found that progress in production and information technologies tends
to have diametrically opposite effects on procurement. In general, progress in production technology
leads to more vertical integration, whereas progress in IT leads to more subcontracting. When
technological change concerns the level of costs, its effect on procurement depends on the cost
differential between the firm and the market; whereas, when technological change affects the effect or
disutility of effort, its effect on procurement is unambiguous. The static and dynamic effects of
competition and monitoring on the frontiers of the firm were analysed. It was shown how increased
24For instance, during the period 1975-1985, American manufacturing firms have increased their IT stock by 600%, compared
to 40% for total capital stock (Kambil, 1991).
25The delay of adjustment of firms to IT can be important: “adjustment to new information technology is a slow and gradual
process, as it works through changes in fundamental altitudes, incentives and culture in the firm” (Bröchner, 1990:215).
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competition between subcontractors, or improved monitoring (both in the firm and in the market), lead
to more subcontracting, but make it more likely that technical change on production (coordination) costs
leads to more vertical integration (subcontracting). 
The results complement those obtained by Lewis and Sappington (1991) concerning production
technology and those of Reddi (1994) concerning IT. Lewis and Sappington (1991) found that progress
in production technology leads uniformly to more vertical integration, a prediction that is not
corroborated by empirical evidence. For instance, Empey (1988) finds that outsourcing is increasing
faster in those industries in which technological change and productivity gains are more important (see
also the discussion in the introduction). The model studied in this paper shows how progress in either
production or information technologies can lead to either more vertical integration or more
subcontracting. Comparing the results obtained here with those of Lewis and Sappington shows that
failing to account for coordination costs not only prohibits us from analysing the effect of technical
change pertaining to coordination costs, but also yields incorrect results regarding the effect of technical
change pertaining to production costs. Moreover, the results can be read in terms of the analysis of
Hubbard (1998) and Baker and Hubbard (2000), who find the following result in the trucking industry:
changes in technology improving coordination leads to smaller firms, while changes in technology
improving incentives leads to larger firms. In our model, progress in IT affect mainly incentives
internally, and mainly coordination externally.
In the real world, investments in IT have grown faster than investments in production
technologies,24 from which we can conclude that productivity gains in information transmission and
manipulation have been more important than productivity gains in physical production. The model
predicts that progress in information technology is more likely to induce more subcontracting,25 while
progress in production technology is more likely to induce more vertical integration. And this is what
is observed empirically: an inverse relation between investments in IT and the level of integration of
firms (Kambil, 1991; Komninos, 1994; Carlsson, 1988; Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Shin, 1996). The
model can explain why more activities are being outsourced in industries where investments in IT are
important.
However, the model also points to cases where the opposite may occur. Empirically, there are
instances where IT have led to increased integration. For instance, more hotel chains are centralising
reservations management (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991). Beede and Montes (1997) analyse 46
American industries and find no economy-wide relation between IT investments and the share of
auxiliary employment. Bröchner (1990) predicts that, in the construction industry, one of the
consequences of IT will be the emergence of more specialized contractors who will tend to integrate
backwards into the supply of specialized materials and equipment. The situation of the trucking
industry, studied by Baker and Hubbard (2000) (see discussion above) is another illustration of IT
inducing more vertical integration. Moreover, the paper provides an explanation for the changing effect
of technological progress on procurement throughout the twentieth century: why it favoured vertical
integration historically, and why it favours subcontracting (or has a mixed effect) today.
26K. Foss (1996) discusses how technological development can affect transaction costs when the latter arise from variability in
the quality or performance of the product.
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The paper constitutes a bridge between agency and contractual explanations on the one hand,
and technological explanations on the other hand, of the existence and frontiers of the firm. While pre-
transaction costs explanations of vertical integration were characterized by technological determinism,
post-transaction costs explanations suffer from what Englander (1988) calls transaction cost
determinism. Williamson has repeatedly argued that transaction costs are sufficient to explain the
boundaries of the firm, and that technology is mainly irrelevant. However, as Englander argues,
technological solutions to transaction costs are implicit in Williamson’s arguments. Elements such as
learning by doing and coordination are fundamentally technological phenomena. Moreover, asset
specificity, which is at the heart of transaction costs theory, is strongly related to technological
considerations.
Chandler (1982) has criticized Williamson for his neglect of technological considerations in the
establishing of a theory of the firm. North (1981) criticizes both Williamson and Chandler for focussing
on one dimension while neglecting the other, and gives more weight to the interactions between
technology and transaction costs. The results of the model favour North’s open position. When both
technological change and informational asymmetry are present, the effect of technological change on
procurement cannot be understood without taking into account informational asymmetries in markets
and firms. The results here go even further than what Englander suggested, for his focus was -mainly-
on the interactions between organizational technology and transaction cost, whereas here it is shown
that even physical capital technology can affect transaction costs. In a more dynamic framework, the
firm may choose technology and organizational forms so as to minimize management and transaction
costs, which makes the interactions between transaction costs and technology even more stringent.26
The disaggregation of the relation between technological progress and the level of integration
of firms is essential in order to isolate the different tendencies at play. At the firm level, simultaneous
progress in production and information technology may leave the level of integration unchanged, not
because there are no effects, but because effects cancel out (see proposition 7). At the industry level,
some firms may invest more in IT, while other firms may invest more in production technologies. The
level of integration can decrease in the former, and increase in the latter. At the aggregate level, some
industries may be investing more in IT, while other industries are investing more in production
technologies. The level of integration may decline in the former, and increase in the latter. Again, the
lack of disaggregation will hide important sectoral effects.
It is well known that the choice of procurement mode is more complex than a simple make or
buy decision. There are many intermediate forms of procurement that firms and suppliers can adopt:
strategic alliances, networks, virtual organizations, telework, etc. Picot et al. (1996) discuss the role of
IT in the emergence of these new organizational forms. Even though our model considers extreme forms
of make or buy, the types of tradeoffs found here (e.g. efficiency and control effects) are likely to
emerge -maybe under different forms- in these intermediate organizational modes. The results obtained
here shed light on, and provide a methodology for the analysis of, the effects of technical progress on
the choice between procurement modes other than classical vertical integration and arms length
transactions. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of a polar procurement mode are shared to
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varying degrees by those procurement modes close to it in terms of transaction attributes. Therefore a
tendency to use more of a polar procurement mode can be seen as a proxy for a tendency to use more
of procurement modes close to that mode.
The model has many potential extensions. One possibility concerns the timing of learning of c
and i. It was assumed that c and i were learned before production took place. An alternative -and
probably more realistic- timing would be that costs become known only at the end of the production
process, after the firm has chosen its procurement mode. Another possible extension would be to
consider other types of technical progress regarding production and coordination costs. It would be
useful to study the effect of technological progress when subcontracting relies mainly on incentives,
while internal provision relies on fixed wages, which is closer to what we observe. Finally, the model
considered incremental technical improvements. The effect of radical innovations -which may change
the cost function- on procurement is yet to be explored.
Figure 2 - The function I(c)
Figure 3 - Different shapes of I(c)
Figure 4 - The relation between I(c) , i’ and c’
Figure 5 - Effect of a decline in t  on I(c)c
Figure 6 - Effect of a decline in  t on I(c)i
Figure 7  - Effect of a decline in t  or an Dc
      increase in t  on I(c)ec
Figure 8  - Effect of a decline in t  or anDi
      increase in  t  on I(c)ei
Figure 9  - Effect of a decline in T  on I(c)c
Figure 10 - Effect of a decline in T  on I(c)i
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(17)
(18)
(19)
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Appendix A - Proofs
Derivation of information rents
Given the characterization of I(c) and C(i) in the text the firm’s expected profits can be rewritten (using
the Fubini theorem) as
Following Laffont and Tirole (1987), the payment made to the subcontractor is
and the payment made to the employee is
Note that the payment of each agent depends on both c and i. 
We substitute Ps and Pe into (17):
Consider the term
in (20). Integrating by parts yields transaction costs (which arise because of the private information of
the subcontractor)
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(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
Consider next the term
in (20). Integrating by parts yields management costs (which arise because of the private information
of the employee)
Substituting (22) and (24) into (20), we obtain
Proof of lemma 1.
With no production costs (12) becomes
where i’ replaced I(c), F(i) replaced F(c,i), and f(i) replaced fi(i). The first three terms represent the cost
of subcontracting, while the last four terms represent the cost of internal provision. Subcontracting costs
are independent of i’, while internal provision costs are increasing in i’. 
Proof of lemma 2.
The proof is along the same lines of the proof of lemma 1, and is also identical to the proof of Lemma
1 in LS.
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(28)
(29)
Proof of proposition 1.
From (12) and (14) we know that 
Let xc/(M 2Bf /MI(c)Mtc ).(tc ), let yc represent the first line of (28) (without the minus sign) and let zc
represent the second line. We are seeking the sign of xc. From (12) we know that xc+yc+zc=0. And yc$0
by virtue of (2) and (10). Moreover zc><0. We have the following possibilities:
xc + yc + zc = 0
(-) (+) (+) = 0 for c<c’
(-) (0) (+)   = 0 for c=c’
(+ or -) (+) (-) = 0 for c>c’
The signs in parentheses represent the signs of the corresponding terms for the range of parameters
specified on the right. In the first and second cases xc is unambiguously negative, meaning that a
reduction in tc leads to more vertical integration. In the third case xc ><0.
Consider the ambiguous case. If I(ðc-g)<ði  for g arbitrarily small, then I(ðc-g) is an interior solution, and
xc has to be evaluated at ðc-g. It is immediate that xc(ðc-g)>0. Together with the facts that xc(c’)<0, that
xc is continuous in c, and that I’(c)>0 at an interior solution, this implies that there exists a unique
c*0(c’,ðc ] such that  c0(c’,c*), xc<0, and  c0(c*,ðc ], xc>0.
We characterize c*. Let H(c,I(c),tc ) represent equation (12). At an interior solution to I(c), H(.)=0. Let
H(c,I+(c), tc+) represent (12) when tc changes to tc+ (with tc+<tc ) and, consequently, I(c) changes to I+(c).
We have that H(c,I(c),tc )=H(c,I+(c),tc+ )=0, for all c0[c,ðc ] such that the solution of both I(c) and I+(c)
is interior. In particular, H(c*,I(c*),tc )=H(c*,I+(c*),tc+ ). However, I(c*)=I+(c*). Hence
H(c*,I+(c*),tc)=H(c*,I+(c*),tc+ ). We eliminate redundant terms on both sides and rearrange to obtain
The result follows from the fact that tctc+.
Consider now the case where I(ðc-g)=ði  (so that xc is not evaluated at ðc-g, because (27) is evaluated only
at interior solutions). Two outcomes are possible: either xc<0 for all c0(c’,ðc ], or there exists c*0(c’,ðc
] such that  c0(c’,c*), xc<0, and c0(c*,ðc ], xc>0. When I(c*)=ði , xc is not evaluated at c*, therefore
xc<0 for all c0(c’,ðc ]. 
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(30)
(31)
(32.1)
(32.2)
(32.3)
(32.4)
(32.5)
(32.6)
(32.7)
Proof of proposition 2.
The proof is along the same lines as the proof of proposition 1, and is therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 3.
Consider first the decrease in tcD. The method used to derive this result is similar to that used by Lewis
and Sappington (1989). For technical reasons this result is more easily derived when Bf is maximized
w.r.t. I-1(i), rather than w.r.t. I(c), as derived above. This entails mainly a change in the signs of the f.o.c.,
but has no effect on the solution.
From (10) we know that
Let 2c/F(I-1(i),ði  )/fc(I-1(i)) and let G(I-1(i)) denote the r.h.s. of (30). Then
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(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(The symbol “=s” in (32.4) stands for “is of the same sign as”). (32.2) follows from (10), (32.3) follows
from substituting (31) into (32.2), and (32.7) follows from substituting from (10). Under our
assumptions on D(.), (32.7) is always positive, and therefore G’(I-1(i))>0. From (10) we know that
G(c)=0. Hence sign(G(I-1(i)))=sign(G’(I-1(i))). Hence M  2Bf /MI-1(i)MtcD>0. It follows that M 2Bf /MI(c)MtcD<0.
Consider next the increase in tce.
From (2) and (10) we know that 
And from (30) we know that
Equations (34) and (35) imply that (33) is positive (nil at c), meaning that an increase in tce induces more
vertical integration. 
Proof of proposition 4.
The proof is along the same lines as the proof of proposition 3, and is therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 5.
By lemma 2 this expression is positive if c>c’, and negative if c<c’. 
Proof of proposition 6.
The proof is along the same lines as the proof of proposition 5, and is therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 7.
This derivative is nil by (12). 
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Appendix B - Private information and welfare
In this section we wish to explore the effect of private information on welfare. This analysis
requires the specification of a social welfare function. In principal-agent models this function generally
coincides with the maximand of the principal. In some circumstances this characterization of the social
welfare function may be too restrictive, however. In our model the firm is the principal, and firm-level
decisions may not be socially optimal. The firm does not account for any externalities resulting from
its decisions. The firm takes into account internal allocative efficiencies, but the procurement decision
may impact upon allocative efficiency outside the firm as well.
Such externalities can arise in the context of procurement decisions. The use of vertical
integration for anticompetitive purposes is a classical example where vertical integration is beneficial
to the firm but harmful to society. However less obvious divergences can arise. Groot (1998) derives
a macroeconomic model of outsourcing where private and social profitability of outsourcing do not
coincide in general, due to differences in governance costs and transaction costs between the two
procurement modes. Firms do not take into account the effect of their procurement decisions on product
diversity and on R&D incentives. When these two externalities cancel out exactly, the socially optimal
type of procurement is adopted. However, in general the two externalities don’t coincide, and the market
may result in too much outsourcing/vertical integration. Choi (1998) studies a model where vertical
integration helps the firm conceal information from its competitors. He finds that the private and social
incentives for vertical integration may diverge. Sekkat (1992) finds divergence between the social and
private incentives toward vertical integration in the presence of unions.
We seek to analyse how the presence of externalities to the firm’s procurement decision impacts
upon the relation between private information and welfare. To illustrate the point, assume that, in the
model studied in this paper, society cares not only about the distribution of rents between the firm and
the two agents, but also about the allocation of resources. Society prefers that the decision rule of the
firm for any information configuration be as close as possible to the first-best decision rule, which
would prevail in the case where no agent enjoys any private information. This can be due to important
externalities to the firm’s decision. However, society does not want resources to be wasted, and it is also
happier when information rents are lower.
In the model it was assumed that both the employee and the subcontractor had private
information on (part of) their costs. I call this configuration e1s1, where e stands for the employee, s for
the supplier, and 1 for the presence of private information (0 would indicate the absence of private
information for the corresponding agent). Consider the following three configurations: e0s0 (no agent
has any private information), e1s0 (the employee has private information, but not the subcontractor), and
e0s1 (the subcontractor has private information, but not the employee). The question is: can an increase
in the number of agents holding private information increase welfare? The following proposition
answers this question.
Proposition 8. Assume that the model is symmetric in the following sense: tc=ti , tcD=t iD, tce=t ie , ðc=ði . Let
I*(c) be the decision function of the firm when no agent enjoys any private information. Let A represent
an externality to the firm’s procurement decision. Let Pe represent management costs (equation 7) and
let Ps represent transaction costs (equation 6).
Let welfare W="A-P, where P0{0,Pe ,Ps}, "=1 if I(c)=I*(c), and "=0 otherwise. Then, for the move
27This is in contrast to most agency models, where distortions from private information tend to add up.
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from a state where only one agent holds private information to a state where both agents hold private
information to be welfare improving, a necessary condition is A>0, while a sufficient condition is
A>max{Pe,Ps }.
Table 5 shows the decision rule adopted by the firm for each information configuration, as well
as the corresponding welfare levels. The shift in the decision rule when only one agent enjoys private
information is due to the bias induced by that agent’s information rents. When an agent does not enjoy
any private information, she chooses the efficient level of CRE, and enjoys no information rents.
Table 5 - Information configurations, decision rules, and welfare
Information configuration Decision rule Welfare
e0s0 I(c)=I*(c) A
e1s0 I(c)<I*(c) -Pe or 0
e0s1 I(c)>I*(c) -Ps or 0
e1s1 I(c)=I*(c) (A-Pe ) or (A-Ps )
Welfare is highest when no agent enjoys private information, in which case the firm adopts the
optimal decision rule, and no agent enjoys information rents, We0s0=A. Welfare declines with the move
from that state to a state where one (and only one) agent enjoys private information. If the employee (but
not the subcontractor) enjoys private information, we obtain We1s0<We0s0, with We1s00{-Pe,0}.
Conversely, if the subcontractor (but not the employee) enjoys private information, we obtain
We0s1<We0s0, with We0s10{-Ps,0}. With e1s0 (e0s1), the firm’s choice is biassed toward outsourcing (vertical
integration); from a welfare point of view, the externality is not realized, and rents may be observed in
equilibrium. 
In the same token, one would expect that the move from a state where only one agent enjoys
private information to a state where both agents enjoy private information would reduce welfare. But
this is not necessarily so. In that case welfare is We1s10{A-Pe,A-Ps}. When both agents enjoy private
information, the firm adopts the optimal decision rule I*(c). The information rents of the employee and
those of the subcontractor can be said to “cancel out” (from the point of view of the firm) in the sense
that the costs of both options (vertical integration and outsourcing) rise by the information rents, and
hence the relative desirability of the two options remains unchanged (compared to the case e0s0).27 In
this case the positive externality A is realized, at the cost of information rents, however.
Taking the sufficient condition, A>max{Pe,Ps}, how likely is this condition to be satisfied? Note
that A measures an externality of a macro magnitude, while information rents are individual-based
(micro) measures. Therefore it is not unlikely that information rents are smaller than A (and they are
likely to be even of second order compared to A). There is a serious possibility that welfare is higher
when both agents enjoy private information than when only one agent enjoys private information.
This result was obtained under a particular condition: the private information held by the two
28On intermediated contracting see, for instance, Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2001).
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(38)
(39)
agents affected the same decision in opposite directions. However, the result is still quite general,
insofar as the private information held by each agent is different from, and uncorrelated with, the private
information of the other agent. Moreover the same qualitative result would obtain with a less
discontinuous welfare function.
The model shows how the manipulation of information can induce the firm to choose the
socially optimal decision criterion, even when its objective function differs in a radical manner from
that of the social planner. By spreading the distortions from private information over all possible
actions, the regulator can reduce the bias in the principal’s decision. Of course, this last course is
desirable only if the benefit from the externality outweighs the losses from additional information rents.
Moreover there is a discontinuity in the effect of private information on welfare: intermediate levels of
private information can be, under some circumstances, the most socially inefficient. Moreover, the
desirability of the observability (or not) of an information may depend on whether another information
is observed or not. While this result may hold more generally in many auction and procurement settings,
it is of particular interest in the case studied here, where there may be externalities to the procurement
decision, and where the benefits of this externality are balanced against the costs of private information.
The principal is always part of a larger economic environment, may have her own objectives,
and may have conflicting interests with, and externalities upon, society. The social planner can be seen
as a super-principal whose agent is the firm. The social planner need not necessarily deal directly with
her agent in order to induce her to account for externalities. She may deal directly with lower level (in
the vertical chain) agents. This gives rise to a new relation between the principal and the agent, where
the principal may prefer to contract with third parties to affect the agent’s behaviour, rather than to
contract with the agent herself.28
Proof of proposition 8.
The first step is to derive the decision rule under each informational environment. Under the symmetry
conditions stated in proposition 9, equation (12) implies that I(c)=c with e0s0 and also with e1s1.
Consider now the case e0s1. In this case (12) becomes
The difference between (12) and (38) is that in the latter equation the terms representing internal and
external disutility of coordination CRE cancel out, the terms representing internal and external effects
of coordination CRE cancel out, and the rent of the employee vanishes. From (38) isolate I(c) to obtain
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(40)
(41)
The sum of the four middle terms in the numerator of (39) is positive by virtue of (34). Hence, with e0s1,
I(c)>c.
In the same fashion the decision rule under e1s0 is derived. In this case (12) becomes
The difference between (12) and (40) is that in the latter equation the terms representing internal and
external disutility of production CRE cancel out, the terms representing internal and external effects of
production CRE cancel out, and the rent of the subcontractor vanishes. From (40) isolate I-1(i)
(remember that at an interior solution, c=I-1(i)) to obtain
The sum of the four middle terms in the numerator of (41) is positive by virtue of the equivalent of (34)
for the employee. Hence, with e0s1, I-1(i)>i, implying that I(c)<c.
The following decision rules were derived: under e0s0, I(c)=c; under e1s1, I(c)=c; under e0s1, I(c)>c; and
under e1s0, I(c)<c. Note that I*(c)=c. Let A>0 represent the value of the externality associated with the
decision rule I*(c). Let Pe represent management costs, and let Ps represent transaction costs. Let welfare
W="A-P, where P0{0,Pe ,Ps}, and where "=1 if I(c)=I*(c) and "=0 otherwise. For simplicity any
deviation from the optimal decision criterion is assumed to eliminate the positive externality.
Figure 11 shows that, given these decision rules, for the move from a state where only one agent enjoys
private information to a state where both agents enjoy private information to be welfare improving, a
necessary condition is A>0, while a sufficient condition is A>max{Pe ,Ps}. 
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